Hitler- a Life Read online

  opportunity to intervene largely at will in the most diverse areas, and, as

  the scholarship of the last two decades in particular has demonstrated, he

  made liberal use of these opportunities. However, as the structures of power

  in Hitler’s regime were diffuse, there is no consolidated and comprehensive

  collection of sources relating to Hitler’s exercise of that power; it is the

  mosaic produced by the numerous studies of specific areas that reveals Hitler’s

  decision-making as wide-ranging and frequently informal. It is becoming

  increasingly evident that in a whole series of key political areas he really did

  hold the reins and involve himself (though with varying degrees of intensity

  at different times and in different spheres) in matters of detail, on top of

  dealing with the business of day-to-day politics. This will become clear not

  only in the realm of foreign policy, but also in particular with regard to the

  persecution of the Jews and the Nazi state’s eugenic policies, constitutional

  issues, rearmament (along with efforts to balance its economic impact),

  Church and cultural policy, propaganda, and a complex set of issues con-

  nected with managing the Party. During the war new areas were added: the

  military command of the Wehrmacht and its supplies and equipment, as

  Introduction 3

  well as matters of importance to the home front such as food supplies and

  female labour.

  In the course of time Hitler created for himself immense scope for his

  own activity and indeed in some areas of politics he was virtually autono-

  mous. He was capable of deciding on war or peace, he established the foun-

  dations of the European continent’s ‘new order’ as he saw fit, and he made

  arbitrary decisions about genocide and other programmes of mass murder

  on the basis of ‘racial’ factors. Yet although this freedom of action Hitler

  enjoyed was probably unique in modern European history, it nevertheless

  arose from historical preconditions and was certainly not limitless.

  The most important of these preconditions was the emergence of an

  extreme right-wing mass movement as a reaction to defeat in war, revolu-

  tion, and the Versailles Treaty, and to the world economic crisis and the

  failure of democracy to tackle this crisis. Additional potent factors present

  in German society and in particular among the elites – nationalism, authori-

  tarianism, racism, militarism, revisionist attitudes in foreign policy, and

  imperialism – could be exploited by this mass movement, once it had come

  to power. And not least among the historical factors that smoothed the way

  for Hitler was the fact that countervailing forces, in the first instance inside

  Germany itself and then later within the European context, were incapable

  of putting up adequate resistance, did not exist at all, or failed. Thus Hitler

  really was in a position, first in Germany in 1933/34 and then in Europe

  during 1938–41, to create tabula rasa and to realize many of his plans in the

  power vacuum that had come about through the destruction of established

  orders.

  Hitler acted not simply as a ‘catalyser’ or ‘medium’ for historical processes

  that existed independently of him.1 Rather, he shaped these in a very dis-

  tinct and highly individual manner by channelling, reinforcing, and concen-

  trating existing forces and energies, while mobilizing dormant but potential

  ones, and by exploiting ruthlessly the weakness or passivity of his opponents

  and deliberately destroying them. Although in the process he took account

  of tactical considerations, his political priorities were unambiguous: from

  the beginning of his career the notion of an empire [‘Reich’] ordered on

  racial lines was central. For two and a half decades he never wavered from

  this. With regard to the external borders and the structure of this empire,

  however, and to the time-scale and means to achieve this aim he proved

  extraordinarily flexible. Hitler’s political strategy can no more be explained

  4

  Introduction

  by positing a ‘programme’ or a ‘phased plan’ (which was a central element

  in the interpretation advanced by the ‘intentionalist’ school of historians2)

  than it can by the notion of some kind of unbridled opportunism.3 The

  challenge is rather to account for this special blend in Hitler of obsession

  with a utopian goal combined at times with unscrupulous pragmatism; the

  latter propensity could amount almost to a reversal of ends and means. The

  figure who emerges is not so much a political strategist or ideologue as

  above all a ruthless, hands-on politician. I argue in this biography that critical

  turning points in Hitler’s policies cannot be seen as the result of external

  constraints and structural determinants but were the product of decisions he

  forced through in the face of resistance and significant retarding factors.

  Yet Hitler could not always have his way. This is true, first of all, of his

  core domestic policy, namely the attempt to produce a population that was

  completely bound by solidarity and geared to war. It is also true of his

  efforts to make his ‘racial policies’ popular with the population at large and

  of his radical anti-Church policies. Again, during the war he was unsuccess-

  ful in reconciling the conflicting aims of his occupation policy and his alli-

  ance policy in a single strategy that could fully mobilize the resources of the

  territory he controlled to support the war he was waging.

  What then were the foundations of this dictator’s extraordinarily exten-

  sive powers? The idea that Hitler’s regime was primarily based on charisma

  and thus derived above all from the enthusiastic assent to his policies on the

  part of a large majority of the German nation, who credited him with super-

  human abilities, is most definitely inadequate. For any attempt to interpret

  him as expressing the longings and hopes of ‘the Germans’ comes up against

  the fact that, before National Socialism came on the scene, German society

  was split into various camps and even the Nazi state was able only to a very

  limited extent to build bridges between them. The Nazi ‘national commu-

  nity’, united in solidarity behind Hitler, turns out more than anything to be

  an invention of contemporary propaganda. Hitler’s ‘charisma’ is not primar-

  ily the result of the masses believing him to possess extraordinary abilities

  (let alone of his actually having any), but rather, in an age of mass media,

  bureaucracy, and social control, is more than anything the product of a

  sophisticated use of technical means to exert power.

  This approach has two consequences for the analysis I am offering: First,

  by contrast with the ‘structural’ analysis put forward by Ian Kershaw in his

  Hitler biography, this study does not explain Hitler as a phenomenon

  primarily on the basis of social forces and the complex of factors that

  Introduction 5

  determined the Nazi system of power.4 My contention is that we have to

  abandon once and for all the image of a man who, overshadowed by his

  own charisma, allegedly became increasingly estranged from reality, let

  t
hings take their course, and to a great extent withdrew from actual politics.

  This is the view of Hitler as an, in many respects, ‘weak dictator’, as Hans

  Mommsen pithily summed up this thesis.5 Instead I emphasize Hitler’s

  autonomous role as an active politician. Secondly, I examine critically the

  claim often made that ‘the Germans’ largely welcomed Hitler’s policies and

  identified with their dictator as a person. The result is a more nuanced pic-

  ture: Through out his dictatorship there was both active support from broad

  sections of the population and a significant undercurrent of discontent and

  reserve. The fact that Hitler’s regime nevertheless functioned more or less

  without a hitch was above all the result (and this factor is frequently under-

  played) of the various means of coercion available to a dictatorship. In

  addition to institutionalized repression there was the Party’s local surveil-

  lance of ‘national comrades’, as well as Nazi control of the ‘public sphere’.

  Over and above the specifics of their lives, biographies of politicians who

  direct and control complex systems of power provide insight into the dis-

  tinguishing features of power structures and decision-making processes, in

  particular when, as in this case, these structures and processes were created

  in large measure by the protagonist himself. In addition, as a result of his

  presence in a variety of political spheres Hitler was repeatedly able to recon-

  figure complex and problematic situations to suit his purposes by ‘dropping

  a bombshell’. What is more, the history of the Nazi dictatorship as told from

  the perspective of the man who stood at the pinnacle of this structure pro-

  vides insights into the connections between the individual political spheres

  in the so-called Third Reich and creates an opportunity to combine the

  specialized discourses developed by historians in their particular fields in an

  overview linked by a single, overarching chronology. Thus a biography of

  Hitler also produces a history of his regime.

  Joachim Fest’s dictum that Hitler was basically a ‘non-person’6 is typical

  of the prevalent disinclination of historians to encounter Hitler on a ‘human’

  level. By contrast, this biography assumes that, in common with everyone,

  Hitler had a personality, that this personality demonstrates certain constants,

  developments, and discontinuities that can be described and analysed, and

  that this analysis of his personality can be productive in explaining his

  political career. This personal element not only played a significant role in

  some important political decisions, but it contributed fundamentally to his

  6

  Introduction

  political outlook as a whole. Thus the behaviour and attitudes of a dictator

  in possession of absolute power were necessarily and fatefully influenced by

  his deeply rooted tendency to develop megalomaniacal plans and projects,

  by his inability to accept humiliations and defeats, and by the resulting reflex

  to react to his fear of obstacles and opposition by a strategy of annihilation.

  Whenever Hitler’s use of this absolute power is being discussed, these per-

  sonality factors must be given due weight, though not to the extent of redu-

  cing his decision-making and policies to them alone. Hitler’s psyche, his

  emotions, his physical being, his life-style, his interactions with others and

  so on – such aspects cannot replace analysis of complex historical material,

  but nor can they be treated in a voyeuristic manner in a special chapter

  called ‘Hitler, the private man’. Rather, the challenge is to view them as inte-

  gral to this person and, where fruitful, to make them part of the biography.7

  By writing his autobiographical work Mein Kampf [My Struggle],

  Hitler, supported by the Nazi propaganda machine, later contributed sig-

  nificantly to the creation and manipulation of his own history. Whereas he

  described his pre-1914 years as a time when he taught himself the things

  that laid the foundation for his political career, this version was frequently

  reinterpreted after the Second World War as the history of a failure, who

  in the narrow provincial world of Linz, in the slums of Vienna, and in the

  cafés of Munich internalized the resentments that he was then able to act

  out in his later life. Yet this interpretation too reads purpose and linearity

  into Hitler’s development when there is in fact no evidence for these.

  Hitler’s extraordinary later career – and this is my focus in this book –

  cannot be explained by the first three decades of his life. It is therefore

  important to resist later reinterpretations and exaggerations. Only then do

  we see clearly that what we are dealing with is no more or less than the

  history of a nobody.

  Prologue

  A Nobody

  A genius. That was how Hitler saw himself and how he wanted others to

  see him. Though unrecognized at first, he had, the story went, followed

  the path predestined for him, thanks to his exceptional abilities, his strength

  of will, and his determination. Hitler invested a considerable amount of

  effort in creating this perception of himself. It was at the core of the image

  that he and his supporters spent a lifetime burnishing. Bound up with this

  image-making was his attempt to obscure his family background and to

  portray his childhood and youth as a preparation for his later role as politician

  and ‘Führer’. He had good grounds for doing so, for when separated out

  from this subsequent ‘narrative’ and confined to the (relatively sparse) facts

  that can count as assured, Hitler’s early life presents a very different picture.

  While providing insights into the development of the young Hitler’s per-

  sonality, these facts also show that his first thirty years gave no inkling of his

  future career.1

  Hitler’s ancestors came from the Waldviertel, a poor agricultural and for-

  ested region in the north-west of Lower Austria. In 1837 Hitler’s father,

  Alois Schicklgruber, was born in the village of Strones near Dollersheim,

  the illegitimate son of Maria Anna Schicklgruber. Whether by chance or

  not, shortly after the Anschluss in 1938 both of these places were completely

  depopulated and destroyed when a large Wehrmacht training area was cre-

  ated.2 It is not clear whether Alois was the son of a miller, Johann Georg

  Hiedler, whom Anna Schicklgruber married in 1842 and who died in 1857,

  or the offspring of a relationship with his younger brother, a peasant, Johann

  Nepomuk Hiedler. In any case, shortly before the early death of his mother

  in 1847, Johann Nepomuk took the boy to live with him in the village of

  Spital and, in 1876, with the aid of three witnesses and in a procedure of

  8

  Prologue: A Nobody

  very dubious legality, had his elder brother posthumously declared to be the

  boy’s father.3 In future Alois used the name Hitler, a variation of ‘Hiedler’

  that was common in the district. The dubious legality of this procedure

  (which was seemingly necessary so that Johann Nepomuk, who finally died

  in 1888, could make Alois his heir) has led to repeated speculation about the

 
true identity of Alois’s father. In 1932, for example, a rumour surfaced,

  exploited by Hitler’s opponents,4 that Alois was the son of a Jew and so

  there was no way that his son, Adolf, could (according to his own criteria)

  claim to be a ‘pure Aryan’. However, despite the persistence of this rumour,

  it has no basis in fact.5 Nevertheless, it is understandable that, in view of this

  and other scandalous rumours that kept emerging, Hitler had no interest in

  discussing his family background, particularly since Johann Nepomuk was

  also the grandfather of Hitler’s mother, Klara Pölzl. Given the doubts about

  who his grandfather was, Hitler’s great-grandfather on his mother’s side

  may also have been his grandfather on his father’s side.

  This uncertainty about Hitler’s family history was not, in fact, untypical

  among the rural working class of this period and it continued into the next

  generation. To begin with, Alois Hitler concentrated on his career. Originally

  trained as a shoemaker, he managed to secure a post in the Austrian customs

  service and so acquired the status of a civil servant. In view of his poor

  educational qualifications this represented a significant career achievement.

  His first posting was to Braunau am Inn on the German–Austrian border

  in 1871.6

  Alois Hitler was married three times and before that had already fathered

  an illegitimate child. His first marriage, to a woman fourteen years older

  than him, failed because she discovered his affair with a young servant girl.

  Alois lived with her and they had an illegitimate child (also called Alois),

  who was born in 1882. After the death of his wife they married and had

  another child, a daughter, Angela. The following year his wife became very

  ill and Alois employed Klara, his niece twice removed, to help out. She had

  already worked in his household as a maid and, even before his wife died,

  he had fathered a child with her. They married in January 1885, a papal dis-

  pensation being required because they were related. In 1885 Gustav, their

  first child arrived, followed by Ida a year later, and Otto the year after that.

  In the winter of 1887/88 they lost all three children, Otto dying shortly after

  birth, while Gustav and Ida succumbed to diphtheria. However, in 1888